CHAPTER 8. COMMUNITY FACILITIES

8.1 INTRODUCTION

8.1.1 CONTEXT

This chapter examines the potential effects of the World Trade Center (WTC) Memorial and Redevelopment Plan (Proposed Action) on the public and publicly funded community facilities that would serve the Project Site and the area surrounding the Project Site. The Proposed Action would make improvements on the Project Site that would result in the introduction of approximately 62,530\(^1\) daytime workers and daily visitors by 2015. This population, as well as the other workers, residents, and daily visitors in the area surrounding the Project Site, would be served by community facilities.

HISTORY

Prior to September 11, 2001, the six buildings on the WTC Site and 130 Liberty Street employed a total of approximately 48,000 people and attracted approximately 7,300 daily visitors each day. Security was provided by the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) and fire services were provided by both PAPD and the New York City Fire Department (FDNY). On the morning of September 11, each of the WTC towers was struck by terrorist hijacked jetliners. Within hours, the Twin Towers collapsed onto the WTC and surrounding areas, causing massive death and devastation in Lower Manhattan. PAPD and other Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the Port Authority) employees, the New York City Police Department (NYPD), FDNY, other emergency response personnel, and concerned citizens heroically responded to these attacks. Countless stories of heroism and bravery endure from this tragic day. From the moment 1 WTC (the North Tower) was hit at 8:46 am, rescuers rushed to the WTC in hopes of helping evacuate those trapped in the towers. Even after the collapse of 2 WTC (the South Tower) shortly before 10:00 am, hundreds of firefighters and others climbed into the North Tower to aid those trying to escape. Included among the nearly 2,800 workers, commuters, and visitors killed on that day are many who sacrificed their lives in order to help others survive.

Community facilities located on or near the Project Site were also devastated, damaged, or destroyed on September 11 and during its aftermath. Engine Company 10 and Ladder Company 10 temporarily lost their station house at 124 Liberty Street as a result of the attack, only recently returning to their rebuilt house. Day care facilities in 5 WTC and 130 Liberty Street were destroyed.

\(^1\) Employment estimates based on use: office, one employee per 250 gross square feet; retail (varies), on average for the anticipated type of retail, one employee per 333 gross square feet; institutions, one employee per 333 gross square feet; parking, estimated for purposes of this analysis. Employment estimates assume full occupancy. An estimated 5.5 million annual visitors to the Memorial and additional visitors to amenities on the Project Site would yield 15,100 daily visitors in 2015.
The effects of the terrorist attacks were felt throughout the region and country, leading to an outpouring of support for the physical, financial, and emotional recovery efforts that continue to this day. The Twin Towers became a symbol of antiterrorist resolve, and the collective determination of the city, the state, and nation called for rebuilding to honor those who died there on September 11, 2001 and on February 26, 1993. The Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC) was formed by Governor George Pataki and former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and charged with the responsibility for coordinating the remembrance, rebuilding, and renewal efforts. With input from every affected and interested community, LMDC and the Port Authority developed the Proposed Action to restore the commercial icon of the Financial District and to remember those who worked, visited, and arrived at the WTC on September 11, 2001, and died there that day.

8.1.2 CONCLUSIONS

The Proposed Action would not have a significant adverse impact on community facilities. This conclusion is drawn from the comparison of conditions in the future with the Proposed Action in 2015 to the future without the Proposed Action in 2015 in the Pre-September 11 Scenario, when full development is expected, and therefore the potential for impacts is greatest. This analysis examines potential impact of the Proposed Action under two scenarios. One scenario is based on current conditions, and takes into consideration development that is currently planned, proposed, or underway. The other scenario is based on pre-September 11 conditions, and takes into consideration development that had been proposed prior to September 11, 2001.

Underlying this conclusion is an awareness of the fact that the WTC Site has been attacked twice in the last decade. After September 11, 2001, extensive measures were taken on local, state, and national levels to reduce the likelihood of another terrorist attack and increase emergency preparedness. These measures include: the relocation of the city’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) from 7 WTC in Lower Manhattan to a secure, undisclosed location; street closings and increased security in Lower Manhattan; increased training and coordination among emergency response providers including NYPD, FDNY, and PAPD; increased security in building design; and legislation such as the Homeland Security Act. However, even with these measures, the possibility exists for large-scale emergencies in the future. This analysis therefore considers, in addition to daily service and protection, the potential effect of larger emergencies on community facilities.

Additionally, this conclusion takes into account the relative number of workers and visitors on the Project Site, because they are likely to require certain community facility services. Final conclusions measure the conditions in the future with the Proposed Action to conditions in the future without the Proposed Action based on pre-September 11 conditions.

Although the Proposed Action would add an average of approximately 42,000 workers and visitors to the Project Site over the course of each day in 2009, approximately 28,000 of these people would be visitors. Because visitors are likely to spend a relatively short amount of time at the Project Site, far fewer than 42,000 people would be at the Site during any given time. In 2015, with full development, an average of approximately 62,500 workers and visitors would be at the Project Site over the course of each day. Because approximately 18,700 of these people would be visitors, the population on the Site at any given time would be far less than the 62,500. Prior to September 11, approximately 47,900 workers and visitors were present at the Project Site each day, among which were only approximately 7,300 visitors. Therefore, the total number
of workers and visitors at any given time would be similar in both the future without the Proposed Action and the future with the Proposed Action conditions.

**NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT**

The Proposed Action would not have an adverse impact on FDNY services or operations. FDNY does not anticipate that the Proposed Action would have any adverse impacts on its level of service in the area surrounding the Project Site. The Proposed Action would neither physically alter any station house nor alter operations of or access to or from any engine or ladder company.

**NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Although patrol and security on the WTC Site are not the responsibility of the NYPD, NYPD is responsible for patrolling and providing service to the area surrounding the WTC Site, as well as responding to emergency calls on the WTC Site. There are many ways to measure the adequacy of police service, one of which is a review of crime statistics. First Precinct crime statistics suggest that the area is well served by NYPD. As NYPD continually evaluates its level of service and makes changes as they are deemed necessary, no significant adverse impacts are expected as a result of the Proposed Action.

**PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

In the future with the Proposed Action, the Port Authority may acquire some or all of the Southern Site (see Figure 8-1). Because the Project Site would be larger in the future with the Proposed Action than it would be in the future without the Proposed Action, PAPD would need more officers to patrol the site. However, this increased demand for officers would not be considered a significant adverse impact. The PAPD would adjust its staffing levels and resources to provide sufficient policing of the area.

**HEALTH CARE FACILITIES**

The Proposed Action would introduce approximately 62,500 workers and visitors to the Project Site each day by the year 2015. It can be reasonably expected that a percentage of these people might need health care services at some time. The demand for health care facilities in the future with the Proposed Action would be no greater than the demand for health care facilities in the future without the Proposed Action in the Pre-September 11 Scenario, and therefore the Proposed Action would not have an adverse impact on health care facilities.

**8.2 METHODOLOGY**

Because it was created specifically to examine the potential effects of development projects in New York City, the methodology of the *City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR) Technical Manual* was used as a guideline in analyzing the Proposed Action.

**8.2.1 SCREENING**

Because the population on the Project Site has been and is proposed to be entirely non-residential, only those community facilities that serve the non-residential populations are

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1 Letter received by AKRF August 5, 2003. See Appendix B.

2 Letter received by AKRF, November 14, 2003. See Appendix B.
typically studied under CEQR. These facilities include NYPD and FDNY. However, the Port Authority owns the WTC Site, and polices all areas under its jurisdiction. Therefore, in addition to studying NYPD and FDNY service, as outlined in the CEQR Technical Manual, this analysis also includes a brief discussion of the PAPD.

A detailed analysis of community facilities that serve the residential population, such as schools, libraries, health care, and day care facilities would not typically be conducted because there would be no change to the residential population with the Proposed Action. However, because of the large scale of the Proposed Action and in the interest of redeveloping the Project Site to support the residential uses in the surrounding community, health care facilities are studied as they would potentially be used by residents, workers, and visitors alike.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS

There would be no residential uses on the Project Site in any condition under either scenario with the Proposed Action. Therefore, this analysis does not study the adequacy of service provided by public schools, attendance at which is largely limited to area residents.

DAY CARE FACILITIES

An analysis of public day care facilities is typically conducted when a proposed action is expected to add a significant number of new residents. Because the Proposed Action would have no effect on the residential population, a detailed analysis of day care facilities is not included in this chapter.

Prior to September 11, an 8,150-square-foot private day care facility operated in 5 WTC. On September 11, this day care facility was destroyed. Private day care facilities respond to market demand whether by workers or by residents. Therefore, it can be assumed that, among the 10 million square feet of commercial space and up to 1 million square feet of retail space proposed, another private day care facility could be located on the redeveloped Project Site in response to market demand.

LIBRARIES

Libraries are typically analyzed only in the event of a significant increase in residential population. Because the Proposed Action would not add residential populations, a detailed discussion of library resources is not included in this analysis.

However, the neighborhoods surrounding the Project Site are becoming increasingly mixed in use, supporting residential, and community facility uses as well as commercial uses that have historically been the dominant land use in the area. The Proposed Action would add workers and visitors to the mixed-use populations in the area. The Proposed Action seeks to make available amenities that will benefit residential as well as worker populations. There is currently one public library located within reasonable walking distance from the Project Site. This library, the New Amsterdam Branch, is located at 9 Murray Street, near City Hall. A longstanding call by residents in Lower Manhattan for a new library below Canal Street indicates that there is a need for an additional library in Lower Manhattan. The Proposed Action would add significant commercial, retail, and cultural space to the area, and would not exclude the possibility that a public library might tenant some of the space provided by the Proposed Action.
World Trade Center Memorial and Redevelopment Plan

Community Facilities

Figure 8-1
8.2.2 FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

The community facilities described below are discussed in this chapter. Because these facilities would respond to both average daily conditions as well as emergency conditions, both types of service are analyzed.

NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT

According to CEQR methodology, a detailed analysis of fire protection is only required when a proposed action would have a direct impact on a station house by altering its operations or accessibility. However, this analysis goes beyond these guidelines. The events of both September 11 and February 26, 1993, clearly demonstrate that FDNY protection is crucial on the Project Site. In order to conduct a thorough and conservative analysis, fire protection is included in this chapter.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

According to CEQR methodology, a detailed analysis of police protection is only required when a proposed action would physically alter the operations of, or access to, a precinct house. However, the events of both September 11 and February 26, 1993, clearly indicate that NYPD plays a key role on the Project Site. On both of these days, NYPD personnel responded bravely and efficiently to the terrorist attacks. On September 11, 23 NYPD personnel were killed as a result of the terrorist attacks on the WTC. In keeping with the conservative nature of this analysis, and due to the large scale of the Proposed Action, this analysis examines the extent to which police protection would be affected by the Proposed Action.

PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Because the WTC Site is owned by the Port Authority, the PAPD has historically played the principal role in providing policing services on the WTC Site. On September 11, Port Authority personnel were among the first to respond to the terrorist attacks, and the PAPD lost 37 people on that day. On a daily basis, PAPD provides police protection and security services on the WTC Site and all other areas under its jurisdiction. Therefore, although not required under CEQR methodology, the potential effects of the Proposed Action on PAPD operations and service have also been analyzed.

HEALTH CARE FACILITIES

Analysis of health care facilities is typically conducted only if a proposed action would add significant new residents. However, on September 11, thousands of people were rushed to NYU Downtown Hospital to receive medical care. Additionally, because NYU Downtown Hospital is the only full-service health care facility south of Houston Street, it may be reasonably expected that workers and visitors on the Project Site might use NYU Downtown Hospital for daily health emergencies. Therefore, a discussion of nearby health care facilities is included in this chapter.

8.2.3 STUDY AREA

The study area for a community facility analysis is related to the catchment area for each individual facility. As per the CEQR Technical Manual, a ¼-mile radius is drawn around the Project Site, and all community facilities that serve any part of this area are considered in the analysis. For example, only one Fire House is located within the ¼-mile radius, but many more serve the area this radius circumscribes, as listed in Table 8-1. Therefore, all that serve this area
are included in this analysis. Further, because services based far beyond Lower Manhattan responded to the emergency situations on February 26, 1993, as well as September 11, this analysis considers the fact that, in the future, facilities located farther from the Project Site might also provide emergency services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire Department</th>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engine Company 10, Ladder Company 10</td>
<td>124 Liberty Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Company 6</td>
<td>49 Beekman Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Company 7, Ladder Company 1</td>
<td>100 Duane Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Company 4, Ladder Company 15</td>
<td>42 South Street</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT
Response time is the primary factor analyzed when assessing a proposed action’s impacts on fire service. Because more than one unit often responds to any given call, all stations that serve a surrounding area are studied, not just the nearest station to a project site. Four engine companies and three ladder companies typically serve the ¼-mile area surrounding the Project Site (as shown in Table 8-1 and Figure 8-1).

However, in the case of significant emergency situations such as those that occurred on September 11, 2001, and February 26, 1993, engine and ladder companies beyond those listed in Table 8-1 could respond to the Project Site. This analysis primarily focuses on those engine and ladder companies that serve the Project Site and surrounding area on a day-to-day basis while also taking into consideration the fact that companies located farther away may also respond to emergency situations of greater magnitude.

Companies far beyond those that typically serve the area surrounding the WTC Site responded to the emergency situation at the WTC.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
There is only one police precinct that serves the area within ¼-mile of the Project Site—Precinct 1. Its boundary, shown in Figure 8-1, stretches from the lowermost tip of Manhattan to Houston Street.

In an extreme emergency situation, such as September 11, police personnel from other precincts might also serve the Project Site and surrounding areas.

PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
The PAPD is only directly responsible for the WTC Site and other properties owned by the Port Authority. Because it is not responsible for providing police services to any area surrounding the WTC Site, the PAPD’s services and operations are only studied within the WTC Site and the proposed Project Site.

HEALTH CARE FACILITIES
Because the catchment areas for health care facilities can vary substantially, there is no specific study area typically used for a health care analysis. However, the two hospitals most likely to be used by workers and visitors on the Project Site are examined in this analysis.
8.3 CURRENT CONDITIONS SCENARIO

8.3.1 EXISTING CONDITIONS 2003

The Current Conditions Scenario represents the best extent possible the current conditions of community facilities in the study area. In order to obtain current data and an up-to-date understanding of these conditions, community facilities responsible for serving the study area were contacted.

NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT

Four engine companies and three ladder companies serve the ¼-mile study area, including other areas in Lower Manhattan. These companies are listed in Table 8-1. Among them, Engine Company 10, Ladder Company 10 (“Ten House”) is closest to the Project Site. It is located directly south of the WTC Site at 124 Liberty Street, on the corner of Liberty Street and Greenwich Street. During the September 11 attacks, six firefighters from the house were killed, and the firehouse, which was built in 1980, was damaged. Following September 11, Ten House served as an emergency command center until it was closed in September 2002 for reconstruction. During this time, Engine Company 10 and Ladder Company 10 were temporarily relocated. Ladder Company 10 was relocated to the home of Engine Company 7 at 100 Duane Street, and Engine Company 10 temporarily operated out of 42 South Street along with Engine Company 4. In November 2003, after over a year of repairs, Ten House reopened. It is currently fully operational, as it was prior to September 11.

As described in greater detail below, on September 11, FDNY was faced with shortcomings in their communications and coordination systems. In the days following September 11, communications and coordination among emergency response providers improved dramatically. There is a continuous and committed effort by FDNY to improve these systems resulting in both improved emergency response as well as daily citywide protection.

Emergency Response

Although Engine Company 10 and Ladder Company 10 are the closest companies to the Project Site, it is common for many fire companies to respond to an emergency. Therefore, this analysis considers the extent to which all companies serving the surrounding area are able to provide satisfactory service.

On September 11, FDNY rang its highest alarm shortly after the North Tower was struck. Less than 15 minutes later, 18 fire companies had arrived to the scene. Within the hour, over 50 companies had arrived from all five boroughs of New York City. Over the course of the morning, engine and ladder companies from Westchester and Nassau Counties responded to the scene. An incident command post was located across from the WTC on the far side of West Street, and operations posts were established in the lobbies of 1 WTC and 2 WTC as well as the Marriott Hotel. Due to the extremity of the disaster and technical shortcomings of FDNY’s communications systems, communication between the command post and the first responders was severely hindered. Firefighters continued to rescue trapped and injured people throughout the WTC up until the very collapse of the Towers. Throughout the course of that morning, 343 firefighters from all five boroughs were killed while rescuing others.

Though FDNY committed large numbers of units to the WTC Site following the events of September 11, normal citywide coverage was maintained. Average response time increased only slightly during this time, from approximately 4.5 minutes to approximately 5.5 minutes,
demonstrating FDNY’s ability to provide adequate citywide protection even in the face of a major disaster. Citywide coverage for special operations, however, was minimal in the days following the attacks. The Hazardous Materials Unit, High Rise Units, Field Communications Unit, Mobile Command Unit, and Rescue Units were committed to serving the WTC Site, and few resources remained for the rest of the city.

**Daily Protection**

Recent communication with FDNY indicates that there are currently no specific plans to change stations or equipment in the area. Because FDNY is required to continually evaluate the need for changes in stations, equipment, and personnel and makes adjustments as necessary, it is assumed that there is currently no shortage of personnel or equipment in the companies serving the area surrounding the Project Site.

**NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

The First Precinct is responsible for serving the area south of Houston Street and west of Broadway, and the area south of the Brooklyn Bridge approach to the Battery in Manhattan. This area completely encompasses the ¼-mile boundary around the Project Site. The First Precinct station is located at 16 Ericsson Place in Tribeca.

There are currently 170 officers deployed by the First Precinct, who serve the area in three tours. The level of police service changes hourly, as more officers are deployed during daytime hours than in the evenings and on weekends. Approximately 340 additional sworn personnel serve in other capacities, including the First Precinct Scooter Task Force, First Precinct Detective Squad, Transit Police in District 2, Transit Bureau Homeless Outreach Unit and Peddler/Panhandler Task Force, and Mounted Unit Troop A.

The primary method of patrol for First Precinct personnel is marked department automobile. Additionally, officers are deployed on foot or bicycle. The First Precinct Scooter Task Force routinely patrols on small motorized scooters to facilitate movement on narrow streets in the Financial District. Mounted Unit Troop A officers patrol on horses given acceptable weather conditions.

The adequacy of NYPD service may be measured in many different ways, including an assessment of crime statistics (by precinct) and a measure of average response time (which measures the number of minutes it takes from the receipt of a 911 call for police to arrive at the scene). The first measure indicates that the First Precinct is sufficiently serving its catchment area. Major crimes have decreased 7.83 percent since the beginning of 2003, 16.92 percent in the last two years, and 62.16 percent in the last 10 years. The second measure also suggests that the First Precinct is providing adequate service. The average response time for the First Precinct is 6.6 minutes, more than 1 minute faster than the citywide average.

**Emergency Response**

An audit of activity for the month of September 2003 reveals that the First Precinct personnel are most often needed to investigate security alarms, handle disputes or disorderly persons, investigate suspicious activity, respond to auto accidents, and aid sick or injured persons. NYPD

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1 Letter received by AKRF, August 5, 2003. See Appendix B.

2 Letter received by AKRF, November 14. See Appendix B.
does not currently have any special patrols or programs that are directly related to the WTC Site. There are some patrols of Lower Manhattan that have been initiated since the city’s alert status has been elevated, and they remain in effect at this time.

**Daily Protection**

Although the First Precinct is responsible for providing services to the area surrounding the WTC Site, the WTC Site itself is served by the PAPD (described below). NYPD is responsible for providing services on the WTC Site only in response to emergency situations.

**PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

**Emergency Response**

In the case of an emergency on the WTC Site, PAPD and NYPD coordinate efforts to respond to emergency situations. However, on September 11, PAPD and other Port Authority employees were among the first responders to the terrorist attacks. PAPD employees are trained both in police services as well as fire response, and therefore are able to respond effectively to both types of emergencies. On September 11, 37 PAPD employees were killed while responding to the attacks.

**Daily Protection**

The PAPD is responsible for providing daily police services to the WTC Site. As a result of the loss of their headquarters in 5 WTC, PAPD operates out of a trailer at the WTC Site. Currently, these services include patrols of the perimeter of the WTC Site, site security, and control of site entrances. Additionally the Port Authority contracts a private security company to control access to the WTC Site. Since the recovery period ended, there have been ongoing meetings among contractors, Port Authority engineers, risk management personnel, and PAPD to assess the adequacy of daily security at the WTC Site.

The current level of PAPD protection on the WTC Site is adequate. There are currently 14 PAPD police officers assigned to the WTC Command and four PAPD detectives assigned to the WTC Site. Either four or five officers patrol the WTC Site at any given time. The primary method of patrol is by car; the Port Authority has a total of eight vehicles it uses to patrol the WTC Site. Currently, in addition to providing security services and patrolling the site, PAPD responds to fires and accidents, and investigates such issues as trespassers and suspicious bags.

**HEALTH CARE FACILITIES**

There is currently one hospital and 10 other health care facilities located within approximately ½ mile from the Project Site.

Among these health care facilities, the NYU Downtown Hospital at 170 Williams Street is the largest, with 173 beds. This was the most heavily used hospital in treating victims on September 11. By 9 AM on September 11, the first victims began to arrive at the hospital, injured by falling debris and suffering from burns. By 10 AM, the hospital’s cafeteria was being used for emergency services, and patients waiting for elective surgery were discharged. Shortly thereafter, natural gas and high pressure steam were turned off at the hospital, and water pressure fell, as water was re-directed to firefighting efforts. The hospital went 11 days following September 11 without phones or electricity, and still has not recovered financially, despite fund-raising efforts. According to the hospital, it is in need of many upgrades and new amenities.
NYU Downtown Hospital is in the construction phase of a $25 million renovation and expansion program of the Hospital Emergency Center. To date, $20 million of funding has been successfully secured from various businesses, federal, state, and city agencies. This renovation will increase the annual capacity of emergency room services from 30,000 patients to 40,000 patients a year. It will also improve and upgrade services to these patients. Although plans for expansion were underway prior to September 11, 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks at the WTC that day plans were modified to include a new bioterrorism decontamination unit.

Other health care facilities in the vicinity of the Project Site include substance abuse centers, mental health facilities and services for the developmentally disabled. However, workers and visitors on the Project Site are not expected to place any significant demands on these types of facilities.

St. Vincent’s Hospital, located at 153 West 11th Street, is another hospital that serves Lower Manhattan. Larger than the NYU Downtown Hospital and offering more service, it is likely that workers and visitors on the Project Site would use the services provided by St. Vincent’s Hospital in addition to the NYU Downtown Hospital.

### 8.3.2 FUTURE WITHOUT THE PROPOSED ACTION 2009—CURRENT CONDITIONS SCENARIO

**NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT**

FDNY does not anticipate any changes to stations, equipment, or operations by 2009 in the future without the Proposed Action. FDNY continually evaluates the extent to which it provides sufficient protection, and makes changes as necessary.

**NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

At this time, no changes are expected to occur to the level of service in the First Precinct or to the physical structure of the precinct by 2009 in the future without the Proposed Action. Its service is under constant review, and is adjusted to respond to increases in demand for services.

**PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

In the future without the Proposed Action, PAPD expects to have to add officers to the WTC Site to provide sufficient security for the permanent WTC PATH Terminal. It also expects to add one below-ground police substation for PATH Police. PAPD bases staffing on its ability to respond to calls within the area it is expected to serve. Therefore, the PAPD continually evaluates its ability to provide sufficient service, and changes its staffing and operations as necessary.

**HEALTH CARE FACILITIES**

NYU Downtown Hospital has plans to significantly expand its service in coming years. A $25 million expansion and renovation has officially begun, and is expected to be completed in phases. The first and second phases would include an increase in the number of inpatient and outpatient new labs, and an expansion of surgery and radiology services. The third phase would include creating a new mixed-use building that would have a new ambulatory care center. The expansion is expected to significantly improve emergency room services.
8.3.3 PROBABLE IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED ACTION 2009—CURRENT CONDITIONS SCENARIO

NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT
FDNY does not anticipate any changes to personnel, equipment, or operations in the future with the Proposed Action in 2009. The Proposed Project is not expected to cause an adverse impact to FDNY services or operations, as FDNY does not anticipate any problems in being able to support the Proposed Action. Again, because FDNY continually evaluates its ability to provide sufficient services, changes would be made as they are deemed necessary.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
The Proposed Action is not expected to cause an adverse impact to NYPD services or operations. PAPD would continue to provide police and security services on the WTC Site and all areas under its jurisdiction. However, visitors and workers would enter NYPD jurisdiction approaching or leaving the Project Site. Therefore, the populations introduced to the Project Site as a direct result of the Proposed Action would also require Police Department protection.

The Proposed Action would introduce significant working and visiting populations to the Project Site and the surrounding study area; however, the First Precinct is not expected to have to make any specific increase to its level of service.

PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
In 2009, PAPD expects that additional personnel would be needed. As the WTC Site is being constructed, it is anticipated that an additional four officers and one sergeant would be needed to provide sufficient service to the WTC Site. Because the Port Authority polices all areas within its jurisdiction, it would need to provide additional services to the Southern Site and BPC Site 26 if they acquired these sites. The Port Authority has the resources available necessary to make these changes and ensure that adequate police protection is provided.

There would be two police substations at the site. One would be located above ground for WTC Site police, and one would be below-ground for the PATH Police.

In addition to security provided by PAPD, Silverstein Properties and future tenants of the buildings on the project site would provide private security personnel. The cultural facilities, Memorial, and the Memorial Center would also likely employ security personnel.

PAPD would continue to work with NYPD in the future with the Proposed Action. Although NYPD would not have the responsibility to patrol or provide security for the Project Site, NYPD and PAPD would respond jointly to emergency calls.

HEALTH CARE FACILITIES
No changes to health care facilities are expected as a direct result of the Proposed Action. The new workers and visitors to the Project Site would not adversely affect health care facilities serving Lower Manhattan.
8.3.4 FUTURE WITHOUT THE PROPOSED ACTION 2015—CURRENT CONDITIONS SCENARIO

NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT
FDNY does not anticipate any changes to personnel, equipment, or operations in the future without the Proposed Action in 2015. Again, because FDNY continually evaluates its ability to provide sufficient services, changes would be made as they are deemed necessary.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
The Port Authority would continue to provide police and security services to the WTC Site and would continue to patrol the perimeter of the WTC Site. NYPD would continue its patrols in Lower Manhattan and in the neighborhoods surrounding the WTC Site. No changes are expected to occur to the level of service in the First Precinct or to the physical structure of the station house by the year 2015 in the future without the Proposed Action.

PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
The Port Authority expects that the PAPD will need to increase the number of officers patrolling the WTC Site in order to provide sufficient security to the permanent WTC PATH Terminal. PAPD continually evaluates the extent to which it is able to provide sufficient service, and makes changes in staffing and operations accordingly.

HEALTH CARE FACILITIES
NYU Downtown Hospital is in the process of renovating and expanding many of its services and facilities. It is possible that this process will continue beyond 2009. However, no specific changes are planned between 2010 and 2015. No other changes to health care facilities are planned by 2015.

8.3.5 PROBABLE IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED ACTION 2015—CURRENT CONDITIONS SCENARIO

NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT
FDNY does not anticipate any changes to personnel, equipment, or operations in the future with the Proposed Action in 2015. FDNY does not anticipate any problems in being able to support the Proposed Action with services. Again, because FDNY continually evaluates its ability to provide sufficient services, changes would be made as they are deemed necessary. It is not anticipated that the Proposed Action would adversely impact FDNY service or operations.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
The NYPD is not expected to be adversely affected by the Proposed Action. The Port Authority would provide police and security services on the WTC Site. However, visitors and workers would enter NYPD jurisdiction approaching or leaving the Project Site and all areas under its jurisdiction. Therefore, the populations introduced to the Project Site as a direct result of the Proposed Action would require NYPD protection. It is the responsibility of NYPD to respond (along with PAPD) to emergency situations on the WTC Site.
Because NYPD continually evaluates its ability to provide adequate service, changes would be made in the future as they are deemed necessary. At this time, no changes are expected, and the Proposed Action is not expected to adversely impact police service.

**PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

In 2015, PAPD expects that the Proposed Action would cause a demand for more personnel patrolling the Project Site. As of now, PAPD expects that an additional two officers per office tower would be needed to provide sufficient service. The Port Authority would have the resources necessary to implement these changes in staffing levels.

Aside from the two police substations added to the Project Site prior to 2009, no changes to PAPD service, operations, or facilities are expected. Security operations at the site are expected to be taken over by F.J.C. Security. As of 2009, security would also be provided by building tenants and Silverstein Properties. As needed, security would also be provided for the Memorial, Memorial Center, cultural facilities, and performing arts center. Any changes to security would be discussed as the need arises. The Proposed Action is not expected to adversely impact PAPD services or operations.

**HEALTH CARE FACILITIES**

Full development on the Project Site would add new workers and daily visitors as a result of the Proposed Action. Although these people might occasionally need health care services, the overall demand for health care services would not increase substantially.

### 8.4 PRE-SEPTEMBER 11 SCENARIO

#### 8.4.1 BASELINE CONDITIONS

**NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT**

Emergency services were provided by the four engine companies and three ladder companies that served the area surrounding the WTC Site. Ladder Company 10 and Engine Company 10 were located at 124 Liberty Street, directly south of the WTC Site. Approximately 40 firefighters were stationed at this facility. An additional two ladder companies and three engine companies served the area surrounding the WTC Site, as shown in Table 8-1. EMS service to the WTC was also provided through FDNY. Prior to September 11, FDNY used the Twin Towers for training in skyscraper protection, as did fire departments from many cities throughout the state and country.

**Emergency Response**

FDNY was responsible for responding to emergencies at the WTC. In the case of an emergency, the Port Authority would hand over authority to FDNY, and these two agencies would coordinate response efforts. Adequacy of emergency fire protection prior to September 11 may be measured by the level of response on September 11. Although FDNY experienced deficiencies in their communication and coordination systems, as discussed earlier, FDNY response on September 11 was timely, heroic, and effective. Additionally, in the face of a major disaster, FDNY was able to allocate large amounts of resources to the WTC and surrounding areas while still maintaining normal citywide service.
Daily Protection

Because fire prevention and protection services at the WTC was the responsibility of the Port Authority, FDNY was only responsible for providing emergency services to the WTC. Prior to September 11, FDNY had entered into various MOUs with the Port Authority. These MOUs outlined the ways in which PAFD would provide sufficient fire protection to the WTC and ensure that all structures on the WTC complied, to the highest degree possible, with city fire codes.

Daily citywide protection provided by FDNY prior to September 11 was sufficient. Average response time to emergency calls was approximately 4.5 minutes.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Prior to September 11, the First Precinct had 182 officers. These 182 officers were deployed in three separate tours, with up to four police cars and 12 officers patrolling the area at any time. Additional NYPD personnel were provided by the First Precinct Scooter Task Force, the First Precinct Detective Squad, Transit Police District 2, Transit Bureau Homeless Outreach Unit and Peddler/Panhandler Task Force, and the Mounted Unit Troop A Combined, these agencies employed approximately 310 sworn personnel.

Prior to September 11, police service was adequate in the First Precinct. Statistics of major crimes showed that the frequency of major crimes had been decreasing. The average response time to calls was also faster than the city-wide average response time. All such indicators suggested that NYPD had allocated sufficient resources to the First Precinct, and that service was sufficient.

Emergency Response

Prior to September 11, NYPD was responsible for providing emergency services on the WTC Site. In the event of an emergency, PAPD would alert NYPD and the two agencies would work cooperatively in response to the emergency.

Daily Protection

Although it was the practice of NYPD to respond to emergency situations on the WTC Site, daily patrol was also conducted by PAPD. Additionally, although PAPD was responsible for responding to non-emergency situations on the WTC Site, NYPD was responsible for the protection of workers and visitors once they left the WTC Site. Therefore, the visiting and working populations using the WTC Site contributed to the total population served by the First Precinct.

The primary method of patrol for the First Precinct had been in marked department vehicles. Additionally, officers were deployed on foot or bicycle. The First Precinct Scooter Task Force and the Mounted Unit Troop A would patrol on motorized scooters and horses, respectively, if given acceptable weather conditions.

PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Prior to September 11, PAPD provided police services to the WTC Site. In 1993, after the first attack on the WTC, and until September 11, PAPD employed 35 officers, four sergeants, and
two detectives. Officers patrolled the WTC Site by car, bike, and foot. According to the Port Authority, PAPD protection on the WTC Site was adequate prior to September 11.

**Emergency Response**

PAPD and NYPD worked cooperatively to respond to emergency calls. In the event of an emergency, PAPD would alert NYPD and the two agencies would work cooperatively in response to the emergency.

**Daily Protection**

On a day-to-day basis, the Port Authority provided police services to the WTC. Prior to September 11, PAPD responded to ambulance calls, elevators emergencies and evacuations, larceny/shoplifting, burglar alarms, accidents, and fires. A private security company handled security on the loading dock. Tenants of the WTC provided additional security personnel.

**HEALTH CARE FACILITIES**

Prior to September 11, six hospital and health care facilities were located within approximately ½ mile of the WTC. The largest of these is the 173-bed NYU Downtown Hospital, located at 170 Williams Street. Prior to September 11, NYU Downtown Hospital had been planning to undertake a major renovation and expansion to services.

**8.4.2 FUTURE WITHOUT THE PROPOSED ACTION 2009—PRE-SEPTEMBER 11 SCENARIO**

**NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT**

Prior to September 11, changes to FDNY staffing or operations by 2009 were not expected to occur by 2009. FDNY continually evaluates its ability to effectively provide service. Changes would have been made in staffing or operations as necessary.

**NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Prior to the events of September 11, it was not expected that any changes would occur to the physical structure or operations of the First Precinct by 2009. NYPD service levels and staffing were, and continue to be, under ongoing review. Increases in population or demand for service would have typically triggered an increase in personnel and service.

**PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Prior to September 11, it was not expected that PAPD would change services or operations before 2009. PAPD would have continued to work cooperatively with NYPD, continually assessing its ability to provide sufficient service, and changes would have been made as necessary.

**HEALTH CARE FACILITIES**

Prior to September 11, NYU Downtown Hospital had planned on expanding the Emergency Department, increasing its capacity by 10,000 annual visits, as well as implementing new

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1 Letter received by AKRF, November 16, 2003. See Appendix B.
clinical programs and expanding outpatient programs. No other changes to health care facilities had been planned.

8.4.3 PROBABLE IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED ACTION 2009—PRE-SEPTEMBER 11 SCENARIO

NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT
The Proposed Action is not expected to have an adverse impact on FDNY services or operations. The role of FDNY on the WTC Site in 2009 with the Proposed Action would be similar to its role on the WTC Site in 2009 if the events of September 11 had not happened. Overall, demand for fire services would be less with the Proposed Action, since much of the proposed office space would not be built by 2009. Because FDNY continually evaluates the extent to which it provides sufficient service, changes in demand for service would be met as needed.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
NYPD would play a similar role on the WTC Site in 2009 under the Proposed Action as it would have in 2009 had the events of September 11 not occurred. Although policing on the WTC Site and all areas under Port Authority jurisdiction would be PAPD’s responsibility, NYPD would respond jointly with PAPD to emergency situations. Additionally, the new worker and visitor populations introduced as a direct result of the Proposed Action would require police protection prior to entering and upon leaving the WTC Site, and would therefore require NYPD protection. However, since most of the proposed office space would not be in place by 2009, overall demand for police services is expected to be less with the Proposed Action.

At this time, no changes are anticipated in the First Precinct by 2009 with the Proposed Action. NYPD continually reviews its service requirements, and increases to demand for service would be met with increased staffing and operations if the need were to arise. The Proposed Action is not expected to adversely impact NYPD service.

PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
The PAPD would be primarily responsible for patrolling, providing security, and protecting the WTC Site and all areas under its jurisdiction. New uses, such as the Memorial, the Memorial Center, and cultural facilities, would also employ private security personnel in addition to service provided by the PAPD.

In the case of emergency situations and in response to 911 calls, the PAPD would respond jointly with NYPD. At this time, no change in demand for emergency response services in 2009 with the Proposed Action is expected, compared with what was anticipated by 2009 had the events of September 11 not occurred.

HEALTH CARE FACILITIES
In 2009 in the future with the Proposed Action, the non-residential population would be less than in the future without the Proposed Action, pre-September 11 conditions. Therefore, the demand for health care services would be reduced in this condition.
8.4.4 FUTURE WITHOUT THE PROPOSED ACTION 2015—PRE-SEPTEMBER 11 SCENARIO

NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT

Prior to September 11, no known changes to FDNY staffing or operations were planned to occur between 2009 and 2015. FDNY continually evaluates its ability to effectively provide service. Changes would have been made in staffing or operations if necessary.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Prior to the events of September 11, no known changes to the level of service in the First Precinct or to the physical structure of the precinct were expected to occur by the year 2015.

PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Prior to September 11, the PAPD was not expected to change services or operations before 2015. PAPD would have continued to work cooperatively with NYPD, continually assessing its ability to provide sufficient service, and changes would have been made as necessary.

HEALTH CARE FACILITIES

Prior to September 11, no changes to health care facilities were expected between 2010 and 2015.

8.4.5 PROBABLE IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED ACTION 2015—PRE-SEPTEMBER 11 SCENARIO

NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT

The Proposed Action is not expected to have an adverse impact on FDNY services or operations. Because the role of FDNY in 2015 with the Proposed Action would be similar to the role the FDNY had been expected to play in 2015 had the events of September 11 not occurred, there would be no significant changes to FDNY stations, equipment, or operations.

The additional population of approximately 62,500 workers and daily visitors to the Project Site would be expected to generate some additional demand for fire services, but staffing and operational changes would be made as necessary.

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

NYPD would play a similar role on the WTC Site in 2015 under the Proposed Action as it would have in 2015 had the events of September 11 not occurred. Although the PAPD would be responsible for policing the Project Site, NYPD would be responsible for responding jointly with PAPD to emergency situations. Additionally, the new worker and visitor populations introduced as a direct result of the Proposed Action would require police protection prior to entering and upon leaving the Project Site. Increases in demand for service would be met with increased staffing and operations as the need arises. The Proposed Action is not expected to adversely impact NYPD service.
PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

The PAPD would be primarily responsible for patrolling, providing security, and protecting the Project Site. New uses, such as the Memorial, the Memorial Center, and cultural facilities, would also employ private security personnel in addition to service provided by the PAPD.

In the case of emergency situations and in response to 911 calls, the PAPD would continue to respond jointly with NYPD.

HEALTH CARE FACILITIES

No changes to health care facilities are expected by 2015 in the future with the Proposed Action. The non-residential population expected on the Project Site would be approximately 62,500. This number is slightly higher than the approximately 55,200 non-residents on the Project Site in the 2015 future without the Proposed Action. Therefore, there could be a moderate increase in demand for health care facilities.